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Turner: Montague's Intensional Logic and the Theory of Types

91.

'MONTAGUE'S INTENSIONAL LOGIC AND
THE THEORY OF TYPES
Raymond Turner *

Is the type theory built into Montague's Intensional Logic (IL) a
help or a hinderance?

In the paper ''The Proper Treatment of Quantification

in Ordinary English" (commonly abbreviated PTQ) Intensional Logic is used
- as an intermediate specification language.

English is translated into IL

and the semantic s of IL is separately provided.
perform it adequately?

Given this task does IL

Furthermore, how well does it continue to perform

this task when PTQ is extended in the way advocated by (for example) Bennett
[1974]?

The particular dimension we are interested in relates to the type

theory. which forms a central component of IL.

Does the type theory in IL

serve any useful purpose or does it just get in the way of an elegant and
intuitively correct semantic theory?
h1hy is IL based on the typed Lambda Calculus and not on Church's
untyped system?

I am sure that a f ull answe r t o this question should be

partly historical but it is not in this aspect of the question that I am
interested.

Perhaps the question ought t o be ·put in the following form:

is there now any good reason why IL should be based on the typed as opposed
to the untyped Lambda Calculus?
I believe that one a rgument we might try to construct, in favor of
type-theory in IL, relates to the categorial structure of English syntax

*

Supported in part by A. P. Sloan Found a t i on Gr ant 80-6-13.
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as it is presented in PTQ.

Consider the syntactic categories IV (intransitive

verb phrases) and IAV (intransitive adverbs).

Expressions in IV denote

functions in E-;- T (entities to truth-values) whereas expressions in IAV
denote functions in (E-+ T)-+ (E..,... T).

The whole of the Montague program is

premised on the assumption that the meanings of expressions are functions of
certain kinds,

Once this assumption is made it is natural to employ higher-order

functions of various kinds - as in the case of intransitive adverbs.
The next stage in the argument involves IL itself.

Intensional Logic is

introduced as a language intermediate between English surface structure and
its semantic specification.

If the meanings of various syntactic categories

in English are ultimately to be various higher-order functions, and IL is to
serve as an intermediary between English and its semantic specification, then
IL must itself be a language capable of expressing such higher-order functions.
But what does this mean?

Does it mean, for example, that our inter-

mediate language needs to be typed?

I do not think so.

One can express a

great deal more in an untyped Lambda calculus than one can in its typed
counterpart.

Certainly, if all we require is the ability to name higher-

order functions then Church's untyped Lambda calculus is a reasonable candidate.
The purpose of this paper is not to examine all the arguments in
favor of IL being typed.

It has a much more positive purpose.

We believe

that type-theory may have a certain role to play in the semantics of natural
language but that it is not best located in IL itself.

As a consequence, we

suggest a natural type-free alternative to IL and provide its syntax and
semantics,

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol8/iss2/5
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2.

93.

A PROBLEM FOR

MONTAGUE'S INTENSIONAL LOGIC
I want to consider a problem which has recently been brought to our
attention by Terry Parsons [1979].

I will illustrate the problem by

reference to the following sentence:
(1)

Jill is crazy,

According to the tradition of Montague grammar (ignoring intensionality) the
meaning of a verb phrase like "is crazy" is a function from E (entities) to
T (truth-values).

Similarly, the meaning of the verb phrase "is writing

papers" in (2) is a function from E to T:
(2)

John is writing papers.

But what are we to make of the phrase "To write papers'' in the sentence:
(3)

To write papers is crazy?

Presumably, the meaning of "To write papers" also has functionality E-+ T.
But then, in (3), the verb phrase "is crazy" must have functionality
(E-+ T) -+ T,
(4)

We might continue in the like fashion,

Consider the sentence:

To be (so) crazy is beyond belief;

where the intention is to refer to the sense of "crazy" exemplified in (3).

I take it, that in (4) the verb phrase "is beyond belief" has functionality
((E-+T) -+T) -+T,

In principle, given enough ingenuity and patience, we

could continue this process indefinitely,

But let's not.

We can best illustrate the problem more abstractly as follows,

Consider

the sequence of sentences:
(i)

Every individual has a property;

(ii)

Every property has a property;

(iii)

Every property which some property has has a property;

(iv)

Every property which some property which some property
has has has a property;

etc,

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1982
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94.

In the first sentence the word ''property will be represented semantically
as a function in
P

= E-+T,

0

The ''propert y" of sentence (ii)
p

1

=

will have futi.ctionality
p

0

-+

T·

'

and generally properties of type n+l will be functions from properties of
type n to truth-values:
= p

n

_,.. T •

Where does "is crazy" come in this hierarchy?

Apparently, everywhere;

just like the word "property" the verb phrase "is crazy" denotes a function
at all levels in th e hierarchy,
complexity.
type,

Unfortunately, IL itself cannot manage such

In IL "is crazy' 1 must be associated with a function of fixed

Parsons seems to endorse the view that ' 1 is crazy" occurs everywhere

throughout the hierarchy when he represents a verb phrase like "is crazy" as an
infinite sequence of functions

one for each level in the hierarchy.

Indeed, as Parsons points out,such duplication of entities in one
syntactic category leads to duplication in others.

For example, the adverb

"allegedly" is a verb phrase modifier and so has functionality Prop -+ Prop
where Prop is the semantic domain of Properties.

But, as we have just

observed, Prop is a whole hierarchy of domains not just one,

Subsequently,

the meaning of "allegedly" is an infinite sequence of functions <a>
n ~w
v1here a e M and where
n

n

= M -+M ,
n
n

So, on the face of it, we have a solution to the problem of sentences like
1 - 4 and i - iv.

The word "property" is associated with an infinite sequence

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol8/iss2/5
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of functions-one for each member of the hierarchy.
something unsatisfactory about this solution.

95.

But there is still

According to it the meaning

of "is crazy' 1 is an arbitrary sequence of functions <f n > n~w where f n E. Pn
for ne:w.

But this is not all that our intuitions demand; they demand

that fn and fn+l have something in commorr.
is restricted to the domain off

n

We want to insist that when fn+l

then this function is exactly f ,
n

But

as things stand we cannot do this since the domains Pn and P n- 1 are disjoint.
We need to make our function spaces cumulative in some way.

Eve'n tually,

we shall achieve this with the aid of identification mappings between the
domains.
We now turn our attention to sentences which seem problematic even for
this theory.

In his paper Parsons sets an exercise for the reader:

try

thinking to yourself "everything has some property" without restricting
"everything 11 to things of a given type.

I think this is an interesting

I for one find it hard to think about this sentence without the

challenge,

structure imposed by type-theory.

Type-theory seems able to play a conceptual

role here and enables us to make sense of this sentence.

So,at this stage

in the analysis, I am very reluctant to give up type-theory.

Nevertheless,

we do seem to be able to assert
Everything has a property

(5)

and mean every thing - not just things of some particular type.
what sense Jo we do this?
going on,
(Sn)

n+1

I believe that something like the following is

When we assert (5) we are asserting
Everythingn has a propertyn+l

for every n.
type

So in

That is, we assert every thing of type

for everv level in the hierarchy.

~

in his system.

~

~~-

n

has a property of

Parsons has no way of saying this

In fact, he quotes Russell's solution to this problem which

is to supplement the grammar with a theory of pragmatics according to which

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1982
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when we assert the above sentence (5) we automatically assert all of its
meanings i.e. for each n, one asserts that everything of type n has a
property.

Whether this is part of the semantics or the pragmatics is a

moot point but how does one get a formal theory to capture the intuition
in either case?
Similar considerations seem to apply to the sentence:
(6)

Being crazy is (just) crazy.

I think there is a clear sense to this sentence but how are we to interpret
it in the context of our hierarchy?
form similar to (5 );

Presumably, we have made a statement in

when one asserts (6) one automatically asserts all of

its meanings i.e. for each n, one asserts:
(6n)

Being crazyn is (just) crazyn+l·

In the context of type theory, I can see no other way to make sense of the
English sentence (6).

that Parsoru's theory would supply no meaning

Note

at all to (6) since, presumably, the type of "is" (or "has") would rule it
ungranunatical.
One thing seems clear.

There is no hope of capturing these intuitions

in a language like IL which is typed.

In such a language verb phrases like

"is crazy" will be assigned a specific type.
language in this strong sense.

English is just not a typed

In section 5 we introduce a language (which

might fulfill this role of an intermediate language),

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol8/iss2/5
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97.
3.

FUNCTIONS OF
INFINITE TYPE
These considerations seem to impose two constraints or adequacy conditions

on any intuitively correct semantic theory:
(I)

We need to be able to represent the meanings of words
and phrases (like "property", "is crazy", ttallegedly")
as infinite sequences of functions which satisfy certain
conditions;

(II)

We require a definition of application (and indeed
self-applications) for such infinite sequences.

Fortunately, Dana Scott has provided us with a ready-made mathematical
theory.

We now outline the main ideas behind Scott's theory.

The treatment

will be very brief and only enough detail will be included to whet the readers
appetite.

The full details are available in Scott [1972] and Barandregt [1977].

The following two notions are fundamental:

COMPLETE LATTICES
complete lattice is a

A

partially ordered set

<D,!:_> such that each subset
XC::..D has at least upper

bound,
(Notice that this guarantees the existence of greatest lower bounds as well
as the existence of a greatest element or .E.£E, tr) and a least element or
bot tom (.L)),

CONTINUOUS FUNCTIONS
Let D, D1 be complete lattices.
A

function f :

D+

D' is contin-

uous iff for each directed set

xco,

f(UX)::: U {f(x):xE X} where

X is directed in D iff
('t/x,y e X) (3 z e-X) (x,y
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1982

~

z)).
7

University of Massachusetts Occasional Papers in Linguistics, Vol. 8 [1982], Art. 5

98.
Given these two ideas we can build new lattices from
old ones.

The following three constructions are the crucial

ones for the application we have in mind:

SUM CONSTRUCTIONS
Let D, D' be complete lattices.
The Sum D + D' is the disjoint
union of D and D' with the
addition of new elements J. ,T
such that, for each x E D or

x

ci D' , ..L ~

x ~ T.

D + D' is a

complete lattice.

PRODUCT CONSTRUCTION
Let D, D' be complete lattices.
The product D x D' is the space
D x D' = { <x, y> : x e D and ye- D' }

where

<x,y>

x c: x' and y
and y, y ' t D' ,

f. <x' ,y'>

=

iff

y' for x , x '€ D

D x D' is a

complete lattice,

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol8/iss2/5
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The next construction is the important one.

99.

It informs us how we

are to turn the space of continuous functions (from one complete lattice
into a second) into a complete lattice

FUNCTION SPACE CONSTRUCTION
Let D,D' be complete lattices.

The

space of continuous functions from
D into D' (written [D-+ D' ]) consists
of all continuous functions from D
into D; where
f !; g <=> (VdE:D) {f(d) ~· g(d)).
Least upper bounds are computed by
UF = 11.d•U{f(d): f£.F)

for F C [D + D'].

The structure

[D+D 1 ] is a complete lattice.
This completes the basic mathematical background.
to

Our intension is

iterate the function space construction in the same way as we constructed

the function spaces of properties - the only difference being we restrict
attention to continuous functions at each level.

We begin with a domain

(lattice) which is largely motivated by our preliminary discussion.

Let

E + Bool

=

where Eis some basic domain (called individuals in PTQ perhaps) and

Bool

is

the domain of Boolean values:

T
Bool

=

/

"

true

"

false

.L /

•

We then define
=

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1982
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Our fir s t constraint demands that we make these function spaces
cumulative,

We do this by defining a sequence of continuous functions

(projections):
V

cp n

1/J

for each n

>

n

n

+ V

V

:

n+l

n+l

+ V

n

o. We define this sequence by induction on n:
<Po (x)

=

>.yeV

I/Jo (x') =

XI

0

• x

(.1)

and
==

4>n

o X o 1/J

1/Jn+l (x') ==

Wn

ox'

<Pn+l (x)

0

n
qi •

n

Note that in higher types it would be unreasonable to use the constant function
identification we used for cp , since such a mapping would destroy the
0

functional character of these objects.

These functions satisfy:

and cp (1/1 (x')) r::.x'; this can be established by induction on n.
n n
can extend the mappings cp , 1/J
n

n

to mappings cp

<Pm-1
cp

nm

(x) =

0 • • •O

(4>

mn

n

+

n

($ (x)) =x
n

In fact we

V as follows
m

n < m

cp n

n == m
o•t•OtlJ

Once again we leave the reader to check that
nm

V

:

X

I/Im

ij)

run

tP

cj>

m <

n-1

mn

(ij>

run

n.

(d)) == d and

(d'))C'd'forO~n~m,
-

We can now define our domain of functions of infinite types.

According

to our intuitions it is to be constituted of infinite sequences of functions
<f >

n n~w

which are related by the condition that f

n

is the best "approximation 11

to f n- available at level n - in terms of our mappings this means tP n (f n+l) = f n ,
1

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol8/iss2/5
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101.
Vco-CONSTRUCTION
The domain Vco is the set

where for <x

C: <y

n

>

OE: w

<y

,

>

n ne.w

<x

>

Vco

is a complete lattice.

n

>

n n£w

Ill$W -

we define

<=> (Vn) (x C.
n -

y ).
n

We can now define
$nm :Vn

+ V

$con :V

+

CX)

and

co

V
n

by

<j>nm(x)

=

<$ni (x)> :i£w

(x)

=

X

$

""tl

n

and

.

Once again we leave to the reader the task of proving <j>=n(<j>n""(x)) = x
and

4>

Il""

($

""n

(x')) C x' •
-

It follows that. up to isomorphism,
VID '

It is this identification which enables us to view is "is crazy" as an
n
approximation of "is crazyn+l",
One of our objectives has been fulfilled,

We have shown how to define

a mathematical structure whose elements are infinite sequences of functions
which conform to our constraints.
We can now turn to the second requirement of our theory:

how are we

to apply such sequences to each other?

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1982
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10.2~
APPLICATION INV
Let x,ye.V

00

,

CD

Then define

The reader should perhaps check (or look-up) that application is continuou s
and satisfies x

n+l

o y = x +l oy = (xoy) .
n
n
n n

But what has become of type-theory in all this?
question given our belief that type theory plays

This is an important
some

role in our

understanding of sentences like (5) and (6). If you recall this belief amounts
to the view that when we assert (5) we assert (Sn) for each n.
definition of application fare here?
associated with elements of V,
a,

How does our

The word "property" and "thing" get

To assert the sentence (5) is equivalent

to

(Vf3g) (g(f) = true);
which in Va, amounts to
(Vf)(3g)((LJ gn+l(fn)) = true),
new
This amounts to the claim that, for each n, either gn+l (fn) = true or it is
undefined (=~) - and it is defined somewhere.

This seems to be what our

intuitions demand.
This all seems rather satisfactory.

We have a theory which confonns to

our intuitions regarding sentences like (1) - (6) and we have what seems to
.hg an appropriate role for type-theory in the formal s emantic s of natural

language.
Theorem.

This brings us to the main theorems of Scott (1972).
(completeness)

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol8/iss2/5
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103.

= LJC\yEV n •(f(y) n )),

In fact, the x required is x

The Theorem follows

n( w

by a relatively straightforward computation for xoy.
Theorem,

(Isomorphism theorem)

V is isomorphic to [V00
CO

Vco].

+

The isomorphism is given by the function qi where

=

Hx)
qi

...

"A.yE:.V •(xoy);

is a one-one and onto continuous mapping V + [V 00 +V ] ,
Q)

isomorphism, VCl:I and [v

ID

Q)

Thus, up to

~ VJ are the same complete lattice and we shall
OJ

often indicate this by using the notation

Vco

=

[V

+
a,

V ],
Q)

The technique employed in the construction of V is a perfectly general
00

one,

It can be used to solve any "system of equations" involving"+",

"x" and

11

+

11

,

The following system for example, occurs in the next section
=

E + BOOL +FUN+ SINN

SINN

=

[INDEX+ v]

FUN

=

[V

V

+

v]

INDEX = w X T.
The most elegant context in which to carry this out is category theory cf.
Smith & Plotkin (1977].

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1982
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104.
4.

NOMINALIZATION
We might have reacted to sentences like (1) and (6) in a rather different

way.

Consider some of these once more:
(1)

Jill is crazy

(2)

John is writing papers

(3)

To write papers is crazy

(4)

Being crazy is (just) crazy.

(to type papers is crazier)

Our initial persuasion was to react to the multiplicity of "is crazy"'s by
claiming that the verb-phrase "is crazy" denotes an infinite sequence of
functions.

But there is a different way to proceed; a way which amounts

to the claim that "is crazy" really denotes j u s t ~ function.
Our discussion in the previous section guarantees the existence of a
domain OBJ which satisfies the following equation:

OBJ

= [ (E +OBJ) -+ BOOL],

where Eis some basic domain (what PTQ calls individuals),

To put

the matter more precisely we are guaranteed the existence of homeomorphisms
cji

and

!Ji:
$:OBJ-+ [(E+OBJ) -+BOOL]
1/1 : [ (E

+OBJ)

-+

BOOL] -+ OBJ,

For the sake of clarity we shall call the domain E +OBJ the domain of things

(THINGS say),
mind.

Let's reexamine (1)-(3) and (6) with these considerations in

In sentences (1) and (2) the verb-phrases "is crazy" and "is writing

papers" denote functions in THINGS-+ BOOL.

In sentence (3) "To write papers"

is really a nominalized form of the verb phrase "is writing papers",
The homeomorphism~ is the one which we shall interpret as the process
of nominalization.

To see what is involved in (3)

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol8/iss2/5
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105.
let f denote the meaning of "is writing papers" i. e, f is an element of
[ (E + OBJ)

+

BOOL] (or [THINGS

+

BOOL]).

The meaning of "to write papers"

is then given by the nominalization mapping as lj,(f)EOBJ - which is a
subdomain of THING (by definition).
an element of [THINGS

+

Everything now works since f. being

BOOL], can be an applied to lj,(f) G THINGS,

we examine sectence (6),

Finally)

Once again "Being crazy" is a nominalized form

of "is crazy" and so. if f is the function which represents the meaning of
"is crazy". then lj,(f) will represent the meaning of "Being crazy".
ljJ (f)

Since

t: THINGS and f E [THINGS ~ BOOL] it makes perfect sense to apply f to

lj,(f).

We have thus provided an analysis of (1)-(3) and (6) without any
explicit appeal to type-theory,

It, is of course, present in the background

in as much as type-theoretic ideas have been used in the construction of these
domains (e,g., OBJ).

Nevertheless, . once the existence of the domains is

guaranteed we can provide a satisfactory account of these sentences without
type-theory playing any explicit role in the analysis.

We have climbed up

the ladder of types to arrive at a point where the ladder can be dispensed
with.
So perhaps my initial claim, that sentences like (5) and (6) could not
be understood or made sense of without some appeal to type-theory, was too
hasty.

Perhaps, the proper role of type-theory is not to be located in the

analysis of sentences like (5) and (6) but rather in guaranteeing the
existence of domains like OBJ,

What ever interpretation of (5) or (6) you

prefer, however,our theory can handle it.
There is more to say about this interpretation of nominalization
especially how it relates to Frege's views on the subject,

This will be

saved for a different occasion,

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1982
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106.
5,

A TYPE-FREE VERSION OF
INTENSIONAL LOGIC

In this section we propose an "untyped"version of IL.

We provide its

syntax and semantics.

"EVIL"

The language we propose (called

for

reasons which are best left unsaid) is similar to IL but the Lambda
calculus component is based on Church's untyped Lambda calculus.
A.

Syntax of

EVIL

The basic expressions consist of a denumerably infinte set bf constants
(non logical) c~ C and a denumerably infinite set of variables xeX.

EVIL

meaningful expressions of

are defined recursively as follows:

1,

Every variable and constant (non-logical) is in

2.

If El and E are (in)
2

3.

If xis a variable and Eis (in)

4.

If E

s.

If E is

EVIL

then so is OE

6.

If E is

EVIL

then

7.

If E is

EVIL

then so is "E and "E.

8.

Nothing else is

B,

Semantics of

1

The

EVIL

so is "'El,

EVIL

EVIL,

EiA E2' El= E2,
then so is ~x E and Ax, E

and E2 are EVIL then so is El(E2),

50

is PE and FE.

EVIL

EVIL

First we need to know what a model of

EVIL

looks like.

attention to those domains which are complete lattices.

We shall restrict
So, in particular,

we can solve recursive domain equations; such equations will form an
integral part of our models.

":'l

=

A model for

EVIL

will be an ordered six-tuple.

<E, V, W, T, < , F>

where

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol8/iss2/5
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10?°.
(i)

F : C + V;

(ii)

W, Tare non-empty domains;

(iii)

"<" is a linear-ordering of

(iv)

Eis a non-empty domain (basic value~;

(v)

Vis a non-empty domain.

T which is continuous,

In addition,we demand that our domains satisfy the following equations:

V = E+BOOL+FUN+SINN
SINN

= [INDEX

FUN = [V

INDEX =

+

+

VJ

VJ

w T
X

where BOOL is the domain of truth-values; SINN the domain of senses and FUN
the domain of functions.
To provide the semantic function itself we require one further domain to
provide the values of variables:
g-. ASG

= [X

T]

+

The domain ASG is the domain of assignments.

The assignment g[xlv] where

x E VAR and ve. V is:

g[x\v] •

C.

'Y·

=y

X

~:(y)

otherwise

Semantic Function
We define a function

VAL : EVIL

+

[ASG

+

[w

X

by recursion on the structure of EVIL.

T +

v]]

We shall assume the model"{ is fixed

a nl leave out all reference to it in what fallows.
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(vl)

VAL[c]

(v2)

VAL[x]

gwt
gwt

=

F(c)

=

g(x)
if VAL[cx]

true

gwt

and VAL[ 8]
(v3)

VAL [ a A f3 ]

gwt

=

if VAL[a]

false

or
.i

(v 4)

(v5),

VAL[ "'a]

VAL[a = 8]

gwt

gwt

=

=

true

= true

gwt

gwt

VAL[s]

=

= false
= false

gwt

otherwise

true

if VAL[a]

false

if VAL[S]

J..

otherwise

gwt
gwt

= false
= true

VAL[B]

true

iff VAL[a]

true

if there exists a v EV such

gwt

=

gwt

(false otherwise)

that VAL[a] g [ XV
I ]Wt = true
(v6)

VAL[:l x a]

gwt

=

if for each v e. V

false

VAL[rx]g[x lv ]wt = false
otherwise

J..
(v7)

VAL[Ax•a]

(v8)

VAL[et(B)]

gwt

gwt

AV

==

VAL[et]

where

V

i FUN

i ]

=

=

Aa •

e-V • VAL[a] g [ XV Wt

ra)
.J..

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol8/iss2/5

gw

t jFUN(VAL[ a ]

if

V

gwt

)

€:FUN

otherwise
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true

if for each w'E W

VAL[a]
(v9)

VAL[Oa]

gwt =

false

gwt

=

, = false
gw t

..J.

otherwise

true

if there exists t'

VAL[a]
VAL[Pa]

, = true
gw t

if there exists w'f W st,

VAL[a]

(vlO)

gwt

gwt

(v13)

VAL["a]

gwt

gwt

gwt

, = false

otherwise

.L
VAL[Aa]

= true

if for each t' > t

false

VAL[ a]

(vl2)

< t

, = false

VAL[a] gw t,
=

I

if there exists t' > t St,

true

gwt

st

otherwise

J..

VAL[Fa]

< t

, = true

if for each t

false

VAL[a]

(vll)

109~

=

;l, w' ~t' VAL[a]

=

(VAL[ a]

gwt

,
gw t

1

t SINN, )wt

A little discussion of EVIL is clearly in order,

Most of the clauses

parallel those of IL except that certain expressions are undefined,
clause (vl3) is of some interest,
one to elements of SINN,

Notice how the operation ''

r"

The

restricts

This replaces the purely syntactic constraint

imposed by IL,
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1982

19

University of Massachusetts Occasional Papers in Linguistics, Vol. 8 [1982], Art. 5

110.

As a side remark note that Parsons example

about "the property

of not exemplifying itself" does not create problems for us.

To see this

let

(j)

==

AX •

I\Jx (x)

be the property of not exemplifying itself,

VAL [t?(P) ]
VAL).

Then if we evaluate

we discover this to be equal to (look at the definition of

VAL["'6')(<? ]. This can only be so if both are equal to ~GBOOL.
We leave a more detailed investigation of EVIL for another occasion*

but certainly the translation of the (PTQ) subset of English into
EVIL would be identical to that for IL.

Of course, one can do a lot more.

One can, for example, handle all of Parson's extension and I believe
all the material in Chierchia [1981].

I recommend EVIL to the

Montague Grammarians.

*In particular one has to prove the following:
function

VAL[<!>] : ASG

-+

[WXT

+

for each

<I>

in EVIL the

V]

is continuous in each of its variables. This is straightforward (induction
on <I>) but tedious:---We leave it to the reader
indulge yourself in a
little EVIL.
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